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Most conflicts in the world in this century have been civil wars taking place in poor and 
fragile states: in 2010 it was reported that every conflict started since 2003 was a recurrence 
of a previous one.1 With this realisation in mind, the international community now devotes 
much attention to understanding how interventions in ‘post-conflict’ settings might be 
designed more effectively to minimise relapse. However, given the persistence of war globally, 
it is pertinent to ask how much progress has been made.
The field of gender and conflict, no less than 
that of state fragility and conflict, similarly 
faces the challenge of reality-testing. More 
than fifteen years after the passing in 2000 
of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
women, peace and security (UNSCR 1325; 
enjoining women’s protection during conflict 
and their participation in peace building), 
little evidence has emerged of significant 
improvements in security levels for women 
in conflict-affected environments (or indeed 
anywhere). Nor has there been much 
progress in raising the profile of women in 
peace negotiations.2
To explore some of the factors that might 
contribute to our continued inability to 
prevent conflict and build peace, this 
working paper describes some of the ways 
in which the international community has 
sought to conceptualise persistent conflict, 
and asks whether incorporating a gender 
dimension into this analysis can enhance 
understanding and expand options for 
effective intervention. It argues that neither 
conflict analysis nor gender analysis are 
unproblematic categories, however: the 
potential for better understanding will not 
be realised as long as conflict analysis is 
dominated by the liberal peace model and 
gender analysis means simply ‘add women 
and stir’. For conflict analysis to comprehend 
the breadth and depth of social relations, 
and in the process to generate more tailored 
interventions that better comprehend 
realities, it needs to undergo a paradigm 
shift towards thinking of conflict and peace 
as complex, iterative, many-layered, and 
dynamic processes, thereby opening up 
opportunities to be enriched by a nuanced 
understanding of gender relations. 
Following an initial section providing a note 
on different interpretations of ‘gender’ in the 
context of conflict analysis and policy, the 
second section of the paper reviews how 
cycles of conflict are described in orthodox 
conflict analysis, how gender has been 
situated within this, and the influence of 
this analytical framing on approaches to 
peacebuilding and state building. The third 
section presents alternative approaches, and 
suggests that interpretations of conflict that 
stress the importance of social process and 
identity would have advantages, including 
more fruitful integration of gender analysis.
‘GENDER’ IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ARMED 
CONFLICT
As a basis for later discussion, we first need 
to examine differences in perspectives within 
the ‘gender and peacebuilding’ field between 
those who see the need to prioritise a women-
centred approach and those who advocate a 
broader gender analytical approach.3
Without wishing to overplay the distinction 
(their goals and concerns overlapping) it is 
nevertheless useful to identify the different 
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aspects of the ‘gender and conflict’ 
problematic that these approaches each 
emphasise. The former, women-centred, 
approach finds its main expression in the 
‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS) policy 
field, founded on the 2000 UN Security 
Council’s Resolution 1325 and its sister 
resolutions passed over the following 15 
years, aiming to clarify the nature of the 
international commitment and update the 
framework to take new security threats 
into account. These resolutions have 
strengthened the international community’s 
commitment to addressing the needs of 
women and girls in war, ensuring their 
protection, taking their work as peace-
makers seriously, and combating impunity 
for those who commit abuses against them, 
and have legitimised women’s voice and 
activism in conflict and peace issues at the 
highest levels. 
However, it is clear that large components 
of international discourse and practice have 
remained impervious to WPS. Moreover, 
even where this is not the case, WPS has 
not necessarily led to material changes for 
women on the ground.4 Fears of a ‘backlash’ 
against women5 have raised questions about 
how the required change can be achieved 
in practice, as well as about the conceptual 
basis for WPS. Stereotypes of women as 
passive victims and as peacemakers, and 
of men as perpetrators of violence, have 
been called into question: real-life examples 
show women actively challenging their 
circumstances and participating actively and/
or indirectly in war and violence. At the same 
time, men may be targeted as victims of war, 
and there are many examples of men resisting 
militarisation.6 WPS is hampered by a lack 
of fit between international policy and local 
reality,7 significantly also a feature, according 
to its critics, of liberal peace more broadly.8
Much attention in Security Council debates 
and resolutions has been devoted to sexual 
violence in conflict, almost exclusively sexual 
violence against women by men, often to the 
exclusion of other types of violence which 
should rightly be of concern too, such as 
‘everyday’ domestic violence, sexual violence 
committed by civilians, sexual violence against 
men, and sexual violence committed by 
armed females. Security Council and other 
global initiatives aimed at countering violent 
extremism, an issue now addressed by WPS 
through UNSCR 2242 of 2015, have been 
accused of actually undermining WPS, on 
the one hand by instrumentalising women 
as informants and on the other by absorbing 
financial resources which might otherwise 
be due to WPS.9
The broader approach, often termed 
‘gender-relational’, insists that gender 
analysis needs to address relationships 
within the ‘whole society’. Moving away 
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from equating gender with women, it 
incorporates aspects of intersectionality 
theory,10 since it seeks to deepen analysis 
by linking gender to other identity markers, 
such as age, social class, sexuality, disability, 
ethnic or religious background, marital 
status, or urban/rural setting.11
The distinction between these two 
understandings is relevant to a consideration 
of cyclical conflict. While the main emphasis 
of WPS is on identifying the impact of war 
on women and on strengthening policy to 
ensure their protection and their engagement 
in seeking remedies, the ‘gender-relational’ 
perspective sets this goal within a broader 
frame and hence encourages, amongst 
other things, an examination of gender 
as a contributory factor in violent conflict. 
Gender may be seen as ‘causal in militarisation 
and war’, with gender relations based on 
violent masculinities ‘tend[ing] to feedback 
perennially into the spiraling continuum of 
armed conflict’.12 Social processes that have 
accompanied civil wars have often ‘reshaped a 
wide range of local social networks, destroying 
some, breaking others into subnetworks, and 
creating new ones’,13 with impacts and further 
impacts sometimes being noted decades 
later. In all these processes, however, no clear 
generalisations can be made about cause and 
effect, since the transformation of gender 
relations can go either forward or back under 
different conditions.
CYCLES OF CONFLICT – 
THE ORTHODOX VIEW
Mainstream 
understandings of violent 
conflict
To understand how the international 
community views recurring conflict, we 
must first examine its overall approach to 
conflict analysis. Mainstream approaches 
to understanding conflict, such as those 
evidenced in the work of the World Bank 
and the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), focus on drawing 
conclusions based on rigorous quantitative 
evidence, and thus fall largely within an 
econometric perspective. Considering 
SIPRI as an example provides a flavour of 
this mainstream discourse. SIPRI defines 
‘conflict’ as an event leading to at least 
25 battle-related deaths in one calendar 
year, as compared to ‘war’, which requires 
at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in one 
calendar year. SIPRI’s annual yearbook 
documents conflict trends and events, 
identifying the major timelines, players, and 
causal factors, and provides information on 
numbers of state-based (including inter-
state, intra-state, and internationalised 
intra-state) conflicts, non-state conflicts, 
and ‘one-sided’ conflicts, as well as the 
numbers of battle-related deaths in each 
conflict category.14
Analysis of this type has typically been 
carried out at a national level. For example, 
conflict assessment guidelines developed 
by the UK government’s Department for 
International Development (DfID) focus 
on ‘structures’, ‘actors’, and ‘dynamics’ 
and on an assessment of DfID’s own and 
other international actors’ interventions; no 
mention is made of either the global political 
dimensions of conflicts or how men and 
women at community level contribute to, are 
violated by, and respond to, the conflict.15 
This ‘classical’ approach assumes that 
conflict has a progressive trajectory, 
moving from latent to violent conflict 
and thence (under the benign influence 
of the international community) to peace 
negotiations, post-conflict transition, 
and eventually to permanent peace and 
stability. The distinction often made by the 
international community between ongoing 
conflict and post-conflict contexts is a key 
one, because categorising a particular 
conflict in these terms has implications for 
intervention and financing decisions. In 
ongoing conflicts, the aim is to support 
military containment, thereby helping to 
create conditions for a political solution. In 
post-conflict situations, i.e. after the signing 
of a formal peace agreement and a suitable 
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period of ‘transition’, the aim is to support 
the rebuilding of institutions in a way that 
minimises the risk of a return to war. 
Much work on post-conflict reconstruction 
and development is based, implicitly 
or explicitly, on a desire to pre-empt a 
recurrence of conflict, thus addressing the 
issue of conflict cycles. However, in reality 
the international community may be equally 
influenced by pragmatic imperatives that 
limit the sustainability of outcomes. For 
example, perhaps conscious of the high 
levels of financial investment expected of it, 
the international community is sometimes 
over-hasty in encouraging a transition 
from ‘ongoing’ to ‘post’ conflict, before 
underlying conflict factors have been 
satisfactorily addressed. In this case it is 
likely that violence will continue to disrupt 
attempts at normalisation. As a case in point, 
men and women in Eastern DRC continued 
to experience their situation as ‘war’ long 
after the government and the international 
community had categorised the country as 
‘post-conflict’.16
Peacebuilding and diplomacy can bring 
conflicts to an end in some circumstances, as 
it has in Northern Ireland, though even here 
grievances continue unresolved and break out 
in unrest from time to time. These exceptions 
notwithstanding, examples abound of 
conflicts that the international community 
has misinterpreted in various ways, largely 
as a result of allowing facts on the ground 
to be obscured in conflict analysis by wishful 
thinking on the part of donors, often with 
disastrous effect. The DRC and Somalia are 
notable amongst these.17
Conflict cycles and the 
‘conflict trap’
Paul Collier, commenting from the 
perspective of a World Bank economist, 
sought to identify the circumstances under 
which some countries were perpetually 
unable, without major reform, to make 
the progress that others evidenced towards 
the well-functioning state, a state in which 
tendencies towards violent conflict would be 
successfully brought under control. Collier 
found that countries with poor economic and 
governance indicators were those most likely 
to experience a recurrence of conflict, since 
conflict was the enemy of development and 
vice-versa; he coined the phrase the ‘conflict 
trap’ to describe their situation and declared 
that ‘the typical country reaching the end 
of a civil war faces around a 44 percent risk 
of returning to conflict within five years’.18 
This statistic, though the methodology it 
was arrived at was later questioned, was 
highly influential for a number of years and 
was adopted by a number of UN and other 
international agencies; for example it was 
cited as grounds for the establishment of 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission.19
Both within and outside the mainstream, 
however, the Collier approach has been 
contested. Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samnet, 
using Collier’s own figures, revised his 
conclusion from ‘half of conflicts recur 
within five years’ to ‘a quarter of conflicts 
recur within ten years’, a shift which they 
pointed out might have significant policy 
implications. Further, they suggest that 
conclusions based on statistical evidence 
are illusory to the extent that they ‘convey 
certainty and factual “truth” even though 
this may be false security’.20 Critics also 
include those who see exclusionary politics 
as being as important as economic factors 
if not more so,21 as well as those who urge 
attention to micro-level political relations.22 
Barbara Walter questioned whether previous 
exposure to conflict or a lack of political 
and economic responsiveness on the part 
of governments was the determining factor 
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Collier’s account, and concluded that it 
was the latter.23 It was this lack of political 
responsiveness that featured as the main 
explanation for cyclical conflict in the 
eventual definitive World Bank statement 
on conflict, the 2011 World Development 
Report (WDR).24 Subsequent WDRs, 
while addressing a range of other topics, 
have largely incorporated this political 
emphasis, as for example the 2017 WDR 
on governance and law.25
The 2011 WDR represents a small but 
observable shift in the international discourse 
around conflict, away from the rigidity of 
linear models and towards a stronger interest 
in addressing complexity, suggesting a view 
of conflict as an evolving and shifting process. 
It proposes that globally conflict may change 
its nature, and notes an increasing trend 
towards large-scale organised criminal 
violence as distinct from politically-driven 
rebellion. It cautions that cause and effect 
can be difficult to tease out, and that the 
move away from fragility and violence to 
institutional resilience should be expected 
to take place in spiral fashion rather than 
in a neat linear progression. However, the 
overall tenor of global discourse continues 
to be unidirectional, macro-focused, and, as 
we see below, masculinised. 
6The orthodox view as  
policy frame
The point is important because of the 
influence of orthodox thinking on 
international responses to specific conflict 
contexts. The concept of the ‘conflict trap’ 
feeds directly into the concept of the liberal 
peace,26 a policy approach that provides 
justification for the international community 
to intervene (including militarily) in the 
affairs of countries whose governments it 
labels as morally or politically unacceptable. 
Spiral diagrams or not, the overall model 
in orthodox thinking continues to be one 
in which repeated cycles of conflict are the 
result of weak state institutions unable to 
replace the dynamics of war with dynamic 
state-citizen interaction. It still aspires towards 
a progressive pathway from pre-conflict, 
through active conflict, to post-conflict, and 
thence to social and economic reconstruction 
via liberal peace interventions from the 
international community, leading ultimately 
to the re-establishment of a permanently 
viable state. Reality, on the other hand, tends 
to be messier, driven by local dynamics rather 
than – and sometimes in direct conflict with 
– global policy imperatives.27
The orthodox conflict model finds further 
expression in the statebuilding approach 
currently favoured under the New Deal for 
Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS).28 
The concept of FCAS reflects the concern of 
major donors that their investments in post-
conflict recovery have failed to lead countries 
emerging from civil war to the golden dawn 
predicted for them. Statebuilding, with its 
five key goals (legitimate politics/political 
settlements, security, justice, economic 
foundations, and revenues and services) 
has emerged as a key policy response to 
the phenomenon of FCAS, promoting the 
reform of institutions and encouraging 
measures to improve state functionality and 
responsiveness, specifically in cases where 
persistent conflict threatens global security.29 
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‘Add women and stir’?
To what extent has the Women, Peace, 
and Security agenda, as set out in UNSCR 
1325 and its sister resolutions, influenced 
mainstream conflict analysis? Has the 
concern with the metrics of conflict duration 
and recurrence made common cause with 
WPS? Belatedly and occasionally, yes. 
Some examples merely provide further 
illustration of the incongruity of reducing 
complex debates to a percentage. Laurel 
Stone, for example, reviewing official 
records of peace negotiation processes, 
concludes that ‘encouraging [women’s] 
participation increases the probability of 
violence ending within a year by 24% ... 
implementing gender quotas for national 
legislatures could increase the probability 
of violence ending within five years by 
27%’.30 Somewhat more substantially, 
Mary Caprioli has demonstrated statistical 
correlations between certain gender equality 
indicators and a country’s propensity for 
peacefulness.31 And although the World 
Bank’s 2011 WDR is essentially a gender-
free zone, subsequent research within 
the World Bank explored what gender-
disaggregated evidence might add to the 
analysis of ‘conflict traps’. 
Resulting from this research, Myra Buvinic 
and colleagues assert that gender difference 
adds an important dimension to conflict 
analysis and has implications for intervention 
design, especially since one of their findings 
is that the gendered impacts of conflict are 
not necessarily consistent across cases.32 
Based on a review of quantitative evidence 
gathered from a wide range of conflict 
contexts, the authors frame their analysis 
around two levels of conflict impact, both 
of which have gendered implications. For 
them, first-round impacts differ between 
men and women and include: a) an increase 
in mortality and morbidity (mainly of young 
men and children) and widowhood (for 
women); b) forced migration; c) loss of 
assets and income; d) sexual and gender-
based violence. Second-round impacts 
consist of household adaptations to the 
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loss of male breadwinners and to the 
demographic imbalance that results; these 
include, in many cases, increased economic 
and political activity on the part of women. 
These first and second-round impacts 
themselves have further repercussions for 
the economic, political, and social fabric, 
and hence for recovery capacity. They 
should therefore be taken into account in 
the design of interventions, for example in 
projects addressing needs for education, 
financial, or judicial services, if the 
international community is to make inroads 
into the ‘conflict trap’. The review suggests 
that ‘gender inequalities shape and are 
shaped by the responses of households to 
violent conflict’.33 It concludes that gender 
is an important variable; giving it sufficient 
attention would enhance the macro policy 
community’s efforts to understand the 
dynamics of conflict and develop more 
effective means of supporting people 
affected by it, both in first-round impacts 
and in second-round adaptations. 
Policy frames falling within the orthodox 
discourse, as well as associated practice, 
have also had trouble incorporating a gender 
dimension. Women’s rights and well-being 
(and if gender is taken into account at all it 
is generally in the form of ‘women’s issues’) 
frequently find themselves at the centre 
of the potentially destructive convergence 
of two forces, local dynamics and global 
policy, with the managers of the liberal peace 
seemingly at a loss mediating the tension 
between them.34 As far as the statebuilding 
discourse is concerned, for example, this has 
been spectacularly ungendered, and the 
component processes of the statebuilding 
framework have largely excluded women.35 
This is in spite of OECD’s own emphasis 
on the need for inclusivity and state-citizen 
dialogue at all stages of the process.36 As with 
WDR 2011, gender has been added in at a 
late stage;37 however, there has been little 
investment to date in researching potential 
links between gender and statebuilding, 
and hence little hard evidence to support 
gender policy in statebuilding38 – or indeed 
to support statebuilding as a strategy for 
gender equality. 
The exclusion of women (and other 
politically subaltern or marginalised groups) 
as statebuilding participants has particularly 
grave outcomes when it occurs in the 
(typically early) phases of the statebuilding 
process which are concerned with political 
settlements. Those engaged in peace 
negotiations and in the establishment of 
political settlements are generally under 
pressure to satisfy the demands of the 
previously warring parties, as a first and 
most urgent step in maintaining security, 
and to postpone the introduction of broader 
and more inclusive settlements until post-
transition. Indeed, participants in peace 
negotiations have been known to exclude 
women explicitly, on the grounds that 
they did not form a defined party to the 
armed conflict,39 thus ignoring both the 
fact of their active participation in armed 
groups and their legitimate interests in the 
terms of post-conflict settlements. As the 
OECD itself acknowledges, the time for 
broadening opportunities for participation 
is at the negotiation stage, before the shape 
and culture of newly-formed institutions 
becomes established. Once reconstruction 
begins, the practices and norms of the 
power-holders are likely to dominate the 
conduct of state-citizen relations.40
In summary, the way cyclical or recurrent 
conflict is described in the mainstream is 
shaped by an econometric approach, which 
seeks to measure the incidence of conflict, 
define its typologies, and assess the factors 
that contribute to it based on quantifiable 
data. Although conclusions based on statistical 
evidence may be useful as contributions to 
arguments around macro policy, they throw 
little light on the complexities of lived realities. 
Orthodox analysis, which forms the basis of 
resourcing and policy decisions governing 
international action on conflict, falls within, 
and supports, a liberal peace approach to 
international relations, ultimately seeking to 
identify the scope for ‘western’ responses to 
and intervention in conflict hotspots. Despite 
8the ‘moral capital’ that the liberal peace 
approach seeks to gain from the discourse 
around women’s rights, mainstream conflict 
analysis retains a masculinised character. Where 
gender figures at all within this framework, it 
merely offers an additional – though valuable 
– layer of data disaggregation, constrained 
by its conceptual parameters in its ability to 
interpret and explain, as well as record, the 
data it uncovers. Little attempt has been made 
within this framework to draw on feminist 
or peacebuilding traditions that might assist 
with understanding the social processes that 
are involved in conflict and peace, rather than 
simply with their measurement. 
A BROADER APPROACH
Opening up the framework
Orthodox conflict analysis focuses on a 
relatively narrow range of contexts and 
examines a simplistic array of causal factors. 
Scholarship outside the mainstream reveals 
that broader understandings lead to richer 
insights and have greater potential to 
identify effective strategies for change.
The mainstream approach to conflict 
analysis tends to focus on situations of mass 
organised violence, specifically those that 
display features triggering identification by 
the international community as ‘conflict’ 
or ‘post-conflict’. Alternative approaches 
see ‘war’ as one manifestation of conflict 
among many – one end, perhaps, of a 
continuum that also includes other forms 
of organised and unorganised violence, 
and which stretches to situations that are 
neither but that have potential for violence 
if mismanaged. Working on conflict defined 
as social and political divisions and ‘conflicts 
of interest’ in more ‘normal’ situations is also 
important. Using the word ‘conflict’ in this 
broader sense, we should recognise that 
it is integral to society – indeed, to social 
progress,41 and that it holds the potential 
for positive change, possibly through 
‘stabilising points’ (people or institutions 
who can provide stability when all around 
them is collapsing)42 or ‘connectors and local 
capacities for peace’.43
The orthodox framework overlooks a broad 
spectrum of dimensions, including the social 
and psychosocial dimensions and related 
issues of cohesion, identity, and history. 
Violent conflict is more likely in contexts 
where integration between different forms 
of social capital is weak, social capital being 
composed of vertical linkages (between 
citizens and state) and horizontal linkages 
(membership of and networking across 
institutions such as the family or clan). 
Social cohesion is manifested in high levels 
of civic engagement and a well-functioning 
state, both being requirements for social 
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Despite the ‘moral capital’ that the liberal peace 
approach seeks to gain from the discourse around 
women’s rights, mainstream conflict analysis retains a 
masculinised character.
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and economic development and for 
effective conflict management.44 Much 
ink has been spilled in contentions over 
the issue of ethnicity - or perhaps more 
accurately the manipulation of ethnic 
identity and ethnic discourse - as a possible 
explanation for recurrent genocides, for 
example in Central Africa.45 History shows 
that underlying tensions and grievances 
often recur cyclically, possibly in different 
forms, over decades if not centuries; the 
knowledge of violence can be transferred 
from one generation to another, and 
informs not only the fact of war but also 
the intensity of the violence. For example, it 
has been suggested that some of the roots 
of the civil war in Liberia can be found in 
the experience of slavery undergone by 
American Liberians,46 and that the cruelty 
inflicted by the Belgian colonial power in the 
Congo found later expression in present-
day civil war behaviour.47 The roots of 
recurring conflict, then, may be sought in 
the behaviour of past generations as well 
as in current structures. 
Infusing a relational  
gender analysis
In what way has gender informed less 
orthodox approaches to explaining 
conflict recurrence? An example can be 
found in research by the development 
agency ACORD addressing the connection 
between gender and conflict in specific 
communities in Sudan, Somalia, Mali, 
Angola, and Uganda.48 Firstly, the study 
found that the gender division of labour 
generally changed as a direct result of 
violent conflict, often drastically, though not 
necessarily permanently. In particular, men, 
having lost access to the resources (such 
as land, labour, or commercial networks) 
on which their power was formerly based, 
found great difficulty in adapting to 
changed economic circumstances, and fell 
into a state of despondency. In contrast, 
women tended to rise to the occasion by 
exploiting whatever economic niches could 
be found, and often took over practical 
responsibility for provisioning and protecting 
their families, whether or not their menfolk 
were with them. Other studies have reached 
similar conclusions.49
In assessing changes to gender relations 
however, a distinction needs to be made 
between gender roles, which the ACORD 
study identified as being highly responsive 
to the demands of a changing environment, 
and gendered institutions and ideologies, 
which were more or less impervious to 
change. In particular, to the extent there 
was any change in women’s standing 
within the household and community, it 
was only partial. The general impact of 
conflict on women was to widen their 
responsibilities and increase their workload 
(albeit in ways they often relished) while 
not providing them with decision-making 
remits concomitant with that increased 
responsibility. Whatever adaptations were 
necessary for practical reasons to the gender 
division of labour, these did not necessarily 
shake the ideological foundations of gender 
relations. The much-vaunted ‘window of 
opportunity’ presented by the post-conflict 
moment was therefore shown to be illusory, 
as long as conscious efforts permanently to 
restructure social relations were not made. 
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The study also identified a range of other 
impacts, including increased reliance of 
households on petty commerce, changes 
to patterns of marriage and courtship 
including the deployment of sexuality 
(for both men and women) as a means of 
achieving economic security, a reduction in 
the authority of older men, a breakdown 
in traditions of socialisation of children 
within the household and increased 
intergenerational mistrust, and increased 
levels of domestic and sexual violence, 
especially where the availability of light 
weapons was accompanied by poor 
employment opportunities for young men. 
Many of these impacts have a demonstrable 
effect on the future coping capacities of 
societies emerging from violent conflict, 
generating the need for further adaptations 
and creating further stress in populations 
already coping with overwhelming 
disruption. These insights undermine the 
presumption of orthodox conflict analysis 
that conflict is to be measured in numbers 
of battle deaths and to be explained 
exclusively by the machinations of warlords 
and financiers, whose elimination will herald 
a sustainable peace. 
A further finding was that although the 
differential impacts of conflict on men and 
women was significant, these went hand 
in hand with differential impacts on other 
categories – on different ethnic groups, on 
different economic classes, or on displaced 
as against settled population groups. In 
northern Mali, for example, armed conflict 
contributed to the detachment of ex-slaves 
from their erstwhile masters, thus reducing 
the workloads of ex-slave women while 
obliging noble women to take up economic 
roles within the household. In southern 
Somalia, one result of the 1991-2 war was 
the polarised fortunes of different clans, 
which in turn shaped differential impacts 
on their men and women. Vulnerability is 
not confined to women, nor is it universal 
among women: war tends to bring 
particularly savage disadvantage to those 
who are already vulnerable, whether they 
are male or female. This conclusion lends 
relevance to an understanding of gender 
that incorporates intersectionality, and 
supports the call for a multi-dimensional 
and relational understanding of gender not 
exclusively focused on women. 
In all five country settings, patriarchal 
struggles for power and control of resources 
were implicated in war, both at the macro-
political level and in terms of local and 
domestic violence. Much violence was 
driven by intolerance, greed, intransigence 
over religion, national level struggles for 
armed supremacy, and aggressive forms of 
masculinity aiming to ‘restore the possibilities 
of ethnic and gender identity’.50 A key 
question then is how the emergence of this 
aggressive masculinity was enabled. At the 
individual level, it is not hard to trace the links 
between perturbations of masculine ideals 
on the one hand and violence on the other. 
Indeed, a different ACORD study focusing 
on men in Uganda had identified ‘thwarted’ 
gender identities as a key generator of 
domestic violence and self-harm by men. 
While male gender identities might not 
have changed radically, the possibilities of 
attaining masculine ideals had been severely 
curtailed.51 This insight suggests one way in 
which the examination of relational gender 
dynamics may prove fruitful in teasing out 
complex and cross-cutting interactions 
between conflict impacts.
In the panoply of consequences and further 
knock-on effects identified through these 
studies, gender and ethnic identities are 
either threatened or reinforced by conflict 
processes, with multiple possibilities for 
the further consequences of each. The 
violence of war typically leads to loss of life, 
loss of livelihood, poverty, humiliation and 
frustration, failures of governance, political 
manipulation, and breakdown of inter-
communal relations; in turn these effects 
generate further manifestations of violence, 
including, for example, domestic and sexual 
abuse, alcoholism and drug abuse, depression, 
suicide, armed criminality, and adherence to 
militias. These in turn reinforce poverty and 
humiliation, further embedding conditions 
which perpetuate war, and leading to a 
general reduction in social cohesion and social 
capital, rendering the communities concerned 
vulnerable to continuing fragmentation. 
Gender identities are deeply implicated in this 
cycle, being key factors in people’s perceptions 
of their social roles and positions. This suggests 
that they must equally be implicated in the 
processes whereby societies pull out of conflict 
cycles to build peace.
Gender and peacebuilding 
Conflict analysis can be judged a useful 
activity inasmuch as it forms a basis for 
identifying actions that contribute towards 
peace. Peace happens when ‘people are 
anticipating and managing conflicts without 
violence, and are engaging in inclusive social 
change processes that improve the quality 
of life’,52 and peacebuilding is a ‘range of 
measures targeted to reduce the risk of 
laps¬ing or relapsing into conflict… to lay 
the foundations for sustainable peace and 
development’.53 While causes of conflict 
may be both internal and external, and be 
situated at micro, meso, and macro levels, 
the resilience of populations most directly 
affected by it is a factor of key significance 
in determining outcomes. 
If gender is implicated in ongoing cycles 
of violence, the test of this is to be seen in 
efforts to reduce violence by re-negotiating 
gender relations. As mentioned above, 
statistical correlations have been identified 
that suggest that countries scoring highly 
on women’s rights criteria may be relatively 
immune to either international or internal 
war.54 There is contextualised evidence 
too that at the level of households and 
communities, dialogue processes that 
support a rethinking of gender identity can 
help bring an end to cycles of violence. 
In Namibia, the ‘bad behaviour’ of young 
men (and to a lesser extent young women), 
which community members had identified 
as having reached crisis proportions, was 
seen to stem from the country’s long 
history of apartheid. Even in remote rural 
areas, apartheid had created extreme 
power inequalities between men and 
women, as well as between ethnicities. 
The communities then concluded that the 
focus should be on unravelling these historic 
power inequalities, rather than on blaming 
the young men concerned;55 the results 
were so powerful that they eventually led 
to major changes in the Namibian education 
system. Secondly, an education project 
in Northern Uganda achieved significant 
reductions in domestic violence as well as 
other positive impacts through a year-long 
process of dialogue between young and 
old men and women, aimed at improving 
gender and intergenerational relations.56
These examples demonstrate how vicious 
circles of conflict can be transformed into 
virtuous ones, since they contain stabilising 
points as well as thresholds for new 
departures, points at which gender identities 
can, with sufficient will, be turned round to 
generate new and more constructive sets of 
relationships. They further suggest that the 
potential for gender analysis to contribute 
to peace is maximised when ‘gender’ is 
understood not only as a campaign for 
women’s rights (important though that may 
be) but rather as a framework for analysing 
situations from the points of view of a wide 
range of actors, thereby opening up new 
possibilities for turning situations round.57
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CONCLUSION
For conflict analysis to comprehend the 
breadth and depth of social relations, and 
in the process to generate more tailored 
interventions that better comprehend 
realities, it needs to undergo a paradigm 
shift towards thinking of conflict and peace 
as complex, iterative, many-layered, and 
dynamic processes, thereby opening up 
opportunities to be enriched by a nuanced 
understanding of gender relations. 
The dominant mode of thinking about 
gender within international organisations 
- with WPS both shaped by and helping 
to shape this - has been, up to now, one-
dimensional. It has failed to make much of a 
dent in mainstream conflict analysis, which 
continues to be positivist, reductionist, and 
masculinist, serving the interests of global 
power structures and the institutions that 
represent them, and failing to acknowledge 
the centrality of local actors or to recognise 
the complex, iterative, many-layered, and 
dynamic nature of the processes of conflict 
and peace. Belated attempts at engendering 
the mainstream approach have extended 
the paradigm to some extent and have 
opened up opportunities for women-
supportive policy, but have been unable 
to escape from the narrow confines of the 
framework, thus limiting the envisioning of 
creative peacebuilding solutions. 
Gender is deeply implicated not only in 
the immediate impacts of violent conflict 
but also in the knock-on effects and 
beyond, including those that facilitate 
the perpetuation of violence for several 
generations into the future. Conceptualising 
both conflict and gender in broad terms, 
recognising their complexity and fluidity, 
does make a difference in terms of the 
richness and accuracy of the picture that 
analysis is able to paint. Applying a relational 
and intersectional understanding of gender 
to conflict analysis permits important insights 
into its social, psychosocial, and cultural, as 
well as political and economic, dimensions 
to be incorporated into peacebuilding 
strategies and practice. 
+ 
Mainstream conflict analysis continues to be positivist, 
reductionist, and masculinist, serving the interests 
of global power structures and the institutions that 
represent them, and failing to acknowledge the centrality 
of local actors or to recognise the complex, iterative, 
many-layered, and dynamic nature of the processes of 
conflict and peace. 
